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Introduction
Every profession has its id´ee fixe, its core response and solution to problems. For example,
to address pervasive traffic congestion on roads, the engineer proposes structural solutions,
planners favor zoning, and architects see design as the answer. The economist sees prices
as the solution. The ‘‘right’’ price will properly reflect the scarcity of road space and bring
demand and supply into equilibrium. As a result, traffic will flow and travel time will be
saved, shattered nerves will be made whole, road rage will be a distant memory, meetings
will begin and end on time, and excuses for being perennially late will no longer be viable.
Much of our work in environmental economics—as researchers, teachers, and
practitioners—is focused on trying to produce this ‘‘Eureka’’ moment, when scarcity
is appropriately recognized via a market-clearing price. But in the case of climate change
and other environmental challenges, the market will not produce the ‘‘right’’ price. Market
failure occurs because for exchanges to happen, assets must be owned, they must be divisible,
and appropriate legal and institutional mechanisms must be in place to enable a price to
emerge. Thus far, in regard to climate change, none of these conditions has applied. The
capacity of the earth’s atmosphere to absorb human-caused greenhouse gases is not owned,
it can’t readily be divided up and sold, and legal and institutional frameworks have not
existed to enable exchange. The market has failed to reflect scarcity value, and global
warming pressures have intensified.
In the early 1990s, the European Union (EU) undertook an ambitious effort to provide a
price signal through the introduction of an EU-wide tax on energy and carbon. This effort
failed because fiscal measures in the EU require unanimous approval by all member states.
Such unanimous approval was not forthcoming then, with fifteen member states, and it is
even less likely now, with twenty-five member states.
The purpose of this symposium is to increase understanding of a more recent ambitious
effort by the EU to correct for the market failure that surrounds climate change. The EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) tries to address the reduction of emissions of carbon
dioxide (CO2 ) by allowing energy-intensive industrial plants and electric utilities in EU
∗Heritage Trust Professor of Environmental Policy, UCD Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
∗∗Research fellow, UCD Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, volume 1, issue 1, winter 2007, pp. 88–111
doi: 10.1093/reep/rem010
© The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: [email protected]
at The Univesity of Calgary on March 19, 2015http://reep.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from
Market and Price Developments in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 89
member states to trade rights or permits to emit CO 2 . The units of CO 2 that can be traded
are called allowances, or, more specifically, European Union Allowances (EUAs). 1 Through
this trading scheme, the EU has succeeded in producing a price signal—via the trading
price for EUAs—that does, in some limited sense, reflect the scarce capacity of the earth’s
atmosphere to absorb more greenhouse gas emissions.
This paper focuses on the key factors that have influenced the development and
functioning of the EUA market that has emerged under the EU ETS. To provide the
background and a point of reference for discussion of the EUA market, we first describe the
institutional and legal framework for the EU ETS, the scheme’s main design features and
provisions, and how these factors are likely to affect the EUA market. Next, in the section
on development and operation of the EUA market, we discuss how the EUA market has
developed and operated since the establishment of the EU ETS. In particular, we describe
the intermediaries that have entered the market to facilitate EUA trading and how the size
and frequency of trades have changed over time, identify the key factors that appear to have
affected EUA prices, and discuss the trends in EUA trading volumes and prices. The section
‘‘Reflections on the Outlook for the EU ETS’’ offers reflections on the outlook for the EU
ETS in the Kyoto Phase and beyond as well as some preliminary conclusions.
The Institutional Framework and Major Design Features
of the EU ETS
In this section we examine the features of the EU ETS that shape emissions trading and
therefore price. These include the institutional and legal framework of the EU ETS, the
nature and scope of the allowance allocation process, and other key provisions of the EU ETS.
The Legal and Institutional Framework
In 1998, following the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Commission
first broached the idea of a European trading regime in a communication, Climate
Change—Towards an EU Post-Kyoto Strategy (European Commission 1998). The first
detailed discussion of a tradable permit system began in March 2000 with the issuance of the
commission’s Green Paper on GHG Emissions Trading (European Commission 2000), which
explained how such a system might operate, and thereby launched the debate within Europe
on the suitability of such a scheme. Thereafter, emissions trading was regularly included
in the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) as one of the possible measures for
meeting the EU’s Kyoto targets.
The Emissions Trading Directive provides the legal foundation for the EU ETS. The
European Commission published a draft proposal in October 2001 and it was formally
enacted in October 2003; there was to be much discussion and amendments in the two
years separating the formal draft proposal and final enactment. The release of the proposed
EU Directive on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading in October 2001 initiated the
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Introduction
Every profession has its id´ee fixe, its core response and solution to problems. For example,
to address pervasive traffic congestion on roads, the engineer proposes structural solutions,
planners favor zoning, and architects see design as the answer. The economist sees prices
as the solution. The ‘‘right’’ price will properly reflect the scarcity of road space and bring
demand and supply into equilibrium. As a result, traffic will flow and travel time will be
saved, shattered nerves will be made whole, road rage will be a distant memory, meetings
will begin and end on time, and excuses for being perennially late will no longer be viable.
Much of our work in environmental economics—as researchers, teachers, and
practitioners—is focused on trying to produce this ‘‘Eureka’’ moment, when scarcity
is appropriately recognized via a market-clearing price. But in the case of climate change
and other environmental challenges, the market will not produce the ‘‘right’’ price. Market
failure occurs because for exchanges to happen, assets must be owned, they must be divisible,
and appropriate legal and institutional mechanisms must be in place to enable a price to
emerge. Thus far, in regard to climate change, none of these conditions has applied. The
capacity of the earth’s atmosphere to absorb human-caused greenhouse gases is not owned,
it can’t readily be divided up and sold, and legal and institutional frameworks have not
existed to enable exchange. The market has failed to reflect scarcity value, and global
warming pressures have intensified.
In the early 1990s, the European Union (EU) undertook an ambitious effort to provide a
price signal through the introduction of an EU-wide tax on energy and carbon. This effort
failed because fiscal measures in the EU require unanimous approval by all member states.
Such unanimous approval was not forthcoming then, with fifteen member states, and it is
even less likely now, with twenty-five member states.
The purpose of this symposium is to increase understanding of a more recent ambitious
effort by the EU to correct for the market failure that surrounds climate change. The EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) tries to address the reduction of emissions of carbon
dioxide (CO2 ) by allowing energy-intensive industrial plants and electric utilities in EU
∗Heritage Trust Professor of Environmental Policy, UCD Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
∗∗Research fellow, UCD Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, volume 1, issue 1, winter 2007, pp. 88–111
doi: 10.1093/reep/rem010
© The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: [email protected]
at The Univesity of Calgary on March 19, 2015http://reep.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from
Market and Price Developments in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 89
member states to trade rights or permits to emit CO 2 . The units of CO 2 that can be traded
are called allowances, or, more specifically, European Union Allowances (EUAs). 1 Through
this trading scheme, the EU has succeeded in producing a price signal—via the trading
price for EUAs—that does, in some limited sense, reflect the scarce capacity of the earth’s
atmosphere to absorb more greenhouse gas emissions.
This paper focuses on the key factors that have influenced the development and
functioning of the EUA market that has emerged under the EU ETS. To provide the
background and a point of reference for discussion of the EUA market, we first describe the
institutional and legal framework for the EU ETS, the scheme’s main design features and
provisions, and how these factors are likely to affect the EUA market. Next, in the section
on development and operation of the EUA market, we discuss how the EUA market has
developed and operated since the establishment of the EU ETS. In particular, we describe
the intermediaries that have entered the market to facilitate EUA trading and how the size
and frequency of trades have changed over time, identify the key factors that appear to have
affected EUA prices, and discuss the trends in EUA trading volumes and prices. The section
‘‘Reflections on the Outlook for the EU ETS’’ offers reflections on the outlook for the EU
ETS in the Kyoto Phase and beyond as well as some preliminary conclusions.
The Institutional Framework and Major Design Features
of the EU ETS
In this section we examine the features of the EU ETS that shape emissions trading and
therefore price. These include the institutional and legal framework of the EU ETS, the
nature and scope of the allowance allocation process, and other key provisions of the EU ETS.
The Legal and Institutional Framework
In 1998, following the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Commission
first broached the idea of a European trading regime in a communication, Climate
Change—Towards an EU Post-Kyoto Strategy (European Commission 1998). The first
detailed discussion of a tradable permit system began in March 2000 with the issuance of the
commission’s Green Paper on GHG Emissions Trading (European Commission 2000), which
explained how such a system might operate, and thereby launched the debate within Europe
on the suitability of such a scheme. Thereafter, emissions trading was regularly included
in the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) as one of the possible measures for
meeting the EU’s Kyoto targets.
The Emissions Trading Directive provides the legal foundation for the EU ETS. The
European Commission published a draft proposal in October 2001 and it was formally
enacted in October 2003; there was to be much discussion and amendments in the two
years separating the formal draft proposal and final enactment. The release of the proposed
EU Directive on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading in October 2001 initiated the
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